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Abstract. The present paper makes an introduction in the contract theory starting 
with the definitions of asymmetric information and some of the problems that 
generate: moral hazard and adverse selection. We provide an insight of the latest 
empirical studies in adverse selection in different markets. An adverse selection 
model, based on Rothchild and Stiglitz is also present to give a perspective of the 
theoretical framework.  
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1. Introduction 
 
A  contract is a promise that two parts make and, where there are stated both parties’ 
obligations for all possible situations. In particular, a contract includes the payment mechanism 
used to compensate the Agent for the effort he used to accomplish the objective of the contract. 
The contract is based only on verifiable variables that can be analyzed by an independent part, 
and which are a guarantee that the contract will be not be broken.   
 
The contract parties’ are called, in the scientific literature, a Principal and an Agent. There is a 
contractual relation between the principal and the agent, where the first contracts the later in 
order to work or to help him take a decision. A well known relation of this kind is the one 
between a manager (the agent) hired by a firm (the principal) to run the business. The 
manager’s contract will specify the payment received by the agent, as well as his duties. The 
agent will decide whether he will sigh or not the contract offered to him by the principal and he 
cannot make a contra-offer – this situation is known as a bilateral bargaining problem. The 
agent will accept the contract only when his expected utility form the contract is larger then the 
utility he has when he doesn’t sign the contract, known as reserve utility level. So, the principal 
is the party with all the bargaining power and he will decide the contractual terms.  
 
In the Game Theory framework, the relation between a principal and an agent is a Steckelberg 
game, where the principal is the leader who offers the contract and the agent is the follower 
who accepts it or not.    
 
If he decides not to sign the contract, the relation between the two doesn’t take place and the 
problem is over. If the agent decides to accept the contract, according to the terms of the 
contract, he has to take certain actions.    
 
The principal – agent relation has the following characteristics: 
  The principal designs the contracts, he decides upon the effort level he expects from the 
agent and he pays him accordingly; 
  The agents accepts or not the contractual terms and he makes the efforts he is expected to; 
  The agent works or takes some actions for the principal.  The Annals of “Dunarea de Jos” University of Galati  
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Hence, the agent’s objectives are opposite to the one of the principal: the salary is a plus for the 
agent but a minus for the principal while the agent’s effort is a plus for the principal and a 
minus for the agent itself.  
 
 
2. Asymmetric information – applications in insurance: literature review  
 
The studies made till now or that are on their way to be finalized underline the most important 
problems in the insurance market. Millions of people in Europe have health or car insurances. 
The economic importance of this facts pressures over a better functioning of the insurance 
market. In this context, economists are concentrated over this subject, which is proved by the 
winning of Nobel Prize for Economics in 2001 by George Akerlof, Michael Spence and John 
Stiglitz. They received the prize for their research in markets with asymmetric information.   
 
In economics and contract theory, an information asymmetry is present when one party to a 
transaction has more or better information than the other party. (This is also called a state of 
asymmetric information). Most commonly, information asymmetries are studied in the 
context of principal-agent problems. (http://en.wikipedia.org) 
 
In order to analyze the asymmetric information, one can start with the hypothesis of perfect or 
symmetric information. So, all the parties that are included in an economic process and have 
access to the same amount of information are considered in an analysis.  
Many economists, such as Arrow – Nobel Prize in 1972, underlined the impotance of the 
hypothesis of perfect information that can be found in most models. Using this information, 
the three economists that received the Nobel Prize in 2001 offer a better understanding of the 
market mechanisms. Their models can be used in different areas: industrial organization, 
economics of development, insurance or finance. These allow us to understand the institutions 
that can influence the negative effects of asymmetric information.     
 
In 1996, the prize for Economics created by the Bank of Sweden for A Nobel was received by 
James Mirreless and William Vickery for their contributions to the incentive theory under 
asymmetric information.  
 
Market theory in asymmetric information is based mostly on the studies of George Akerlof, 
Michael Spence and John Stiglitz. Their applications started with the traditional agricultural 
markets and were followed by studies on financial markets. They showed that the phenomena 
encountered on different markets can be better understood by adding the hypothesis of 
asymmetric information that asses that a market participant is more informed then another one. 
Examples are a car seller that knows better the car quality then the buyer, the insurants that 
know better their attitudes towards risk then the insurance company, etc.   
 
Their work can be synthesized as it follows: Akerlof showed that asymmetric information can 
induce the presence of adverse selection in the market, Spence showed that informed agents 
can be determined to signal their private information to the uninformed agents and Stiglitz 
demonstrated that the less informed agents can get the information indirectly from the 
informed agents by offering them contracts that can be substituted one by the others in a 
transaction and auto-select the necessary information.    
 
The asymmetric information in insurance market is a situation where the consumers are better 
informed then the insurers (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). But, the insurance companies have 
a hole different opinion about the definition of asymmetric information, considering that the 
individuals have a limited experience while the statistic methods used to estimate their 
knowledge have progressed.  
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Adverse selection is a process that takes place when the individuals that are expected to lose 
must pay the same insurance premium while the individuals that are expected to win or lose 
less will chose not to be insured so the insurance company will only have clients that will bring 
her great losses. Due to the presence of adverse selection, the insurance markets encounter a lot 
of difficulties.  (World Bank, 2000) 
 
Moral hazard is the loss suffered by an insurance company after a probable luck of honesty or 
prudence from the insurants. (www.cogsci.princeton.edu) 
 
The hypothesis of the adverse selection show that, while the insurance companies know better 
the risk, the insurants have certain personal information, unobserved by the insurance 
company, and which are relevant to find the risk.  
 
Chiappori and Salanie (2000) state that it is possible the adverse selection can not be present in 
some insurance markets. Further more, if we assume that the insurance companies are better 
informed about the insurant risk, and then the former are better informed about the risk. Based 
on this, Villeneuve (2000) proposed an analysis of better informed insurants that will study the 
way in which the information is transmitted.  
 
The results of adverse selection and moral hazard were studied in different situations that are 
related to: 
  Different market structure: monopoly, oligopoly and perfect competition (for instance: 
Arnott and Stiglitz (1991), Jack (1998)) 
  Different types scanning variables (Chernew et al (1999)); 
  Different time moments: static and dynamic insurance (Janssen şi Karamychey (2001)); 
  Different sources of agents’ homogeneity: from the classic differences between random 
probabilities till the differences in the degree of risk aversion and the accidents flow 
(Eeckhouldt et al. (1988), Fluet (1992)); 
  Models specific to insurance markets based on genetic algorithms (Sellgren (2001)).   
 
The presence of adverse selection and moral hazard in the insurance market was empirically 
tested. Wolfe and Goddeeries (1991) studied the demand of a certain type of life medical 
insurance, Medigat and discovered a very wick presence of adverse selection.  
 
Pueltz and Snow (1994) tested the same this in the US car insurance market and they 
discovered that the agents with a large risk loving coefficient choose the insurance with a 
larger coverage, which is consistent to the adverse selection.  
 
In 2001, Godfried studied the dental insurance demand in Holland, which was included in the 
standard medical insurance package in 1995. The conclusion was that the agents with a large 
inclination toward risk tend to buy a supplementary dental insurance. Other studies came to 
different conclusions.  
 
Chiappori and Salanie (2000) studied the car insurance market in France and Cordon and 
Hendel (1999) studied the health insurance market. Cawley and Philipson (1999) studied the 
life insurance market in US. These studies showed that there is no explicit presence of adverse 
selection and moral hazard in these markets. 
 
Similar studied were done by Dionne and Vanasse, Chiappori and Salanie (2000), Dionne, 
Gourieroux, and Vanasse (1997), Richaudeau (1999) and Dionne et al. (2001), some of them 
being interested by the car insurance market.  
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The life insurance market was also studied by Chiappori and Salanie (2003), Chiappori, 
Geoffard and Kyriadizou (1998), Cardon and Hendel (1998) as well as Hendel and Lizzeri 
(1999). Poterba and Finkelstein (2003) studied the annuity contracts and Chiappori (2000) 
made different attempts to distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard in empiric 
tests.  
 
At the moment, the asymmetric information is studied empirically and it brings the most 
interesting results that will lead to improvements of the theoretical models. Everything that is 
written our day on adverse selection and moral hazard is mainly a base for the future 
development of this domain.  
 
 
3. The basic adverse selection model – Macho-Stadler, Castrillo (2005)  
 
Based on Mirrlees (1971), Spence (1974), Mussa and Rosen (1978), Baron and Myerson 
(1982) and Guesnerie and Laffont (1984), Macho Stadler and Castrillo (2005) presented the 
adverse selection problem considering the general Principal-Agent model.  
 
The principal is risk neutral and he hires an agent that can be neutral or risk adverse in order to 
work for him. It is assumed that the effort e will lead to a principal’s expected profit  () e Π . The 
effort is assumed to be a verifiable variable and because the principal is risk neutral, the profit 
will be given by:  ∑
=
= Π
n
1 i
i i x ) e ( p ) e ( , where  i x  is the result that can be obtained by the principal 
with the probability  ) e ( pi  that depends by the effort e.   
 
In order for the objective functions to be concave, it is assumed that   0 ) e ( > Π′  and  0 ) e ( < Π′ ′ . 
 
The agent can be of different types and the principal cannot distinguish between these. The two 
types of agents (a “good” one, that is willing to work and a “bad” one that will work less) have 
only a different disutility function of the effort,  ) e ( v for the “good”| agent (or type 1) and 
) e ( kv , where  1 k >  for the “bad” agent (or type 2). The disutility given by a known level of 
effort is larger for the agent of type 2. This is why the type 1 agent will be considered to be the 
“good - G” or “bad - B” agent and the principal will pay less for the type B agent. Knowing 
these, the agents’ utility functions will be:       
) e ( v ) w ( u ) e , w ( U
G − = ,  
) e ( kv ) w ( u ) e , w ( U
B − = . 
The optimum problem for the principal will consist in maximizing the expected profits under 
the condition that the agent will chose the contract accordingly to his type:  
() () [] [ ] [ ]
B B G G
w , e , w , e
w ) e ( ) q 1 ( w ) e ( q Max
B B G G − Π − + − Π  
U ) e ( v ) w ( u to subject
G G ≥ −      (1) 
U ) e ( kv ) w ( u
B B ≥ −       (2) 
) e ( v ) w ( u ) e ( v ) w ( u
B B G G − ≥ −      (3) 
) e ( kv ) w ( u ) e ( kv ) w ( u
G G B B − ≥ −    (4) 
 
The first two restrictions show that the agents will chose the contracts that are destined to them 
and they are called participation constraints. The last two constraints are the conditions that 
make each type of agent to accept their own contract instead of the contract intended for the 
other type. These are known as the auto-selection or incentive constraints.  
 
Before solving the optimum problem, the inequality (1) can be obtained from the relations (2) 
and (3):  
U ) e ( kv ) w ( u ) e ( v ) w ( u ) e ( v ) w ( u
B B B B G G ≥ − ≥ − ≥ − , The Annals of “Dunarea de Jos” University of Galati  
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so we can eliminate it. Actually, this is a characteristic of adverse selection problems. The only 
participation constraint important for the principal is the one corresponding to the less efficient 
agent because this agent has an incentive constraint that shows he wishes to be considered as if 
he is of the either type. The participation constraints show that all types of agents have at least 
the reserve utility, even the efficient agent.  
 
We can observe that for the participation constraints to be saturated, the optimal contracts must 
be the one where the most efficient agent works with high level of effort:  
B G e e ≥ , because 
relations (3) and (4) show that: 
[ ] ) e ( v ) e ( v k ) w ( u ) w ( u ) e ( v ) e ( v
B G B G B G − ≤ − ≤ −             (5) 
 
that leads to  ( ) ( )
B G e v e v ≥ , because k>1.  
  
Let  μ λ,  and δ  be the Lagrangean multipliers associated to the constraints (3), (4) and (5). The 
Lagrangean associated to the optimum problem is:   
() ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ]
() ( ) []
()( )()( ) []
() ( )() ( ) []
G G B B
B B G G
B B
B B G G B G B G
e kv w u e kv w u
e v w u e v w u
U e kv w u
w e q 1 w e q , , , w , w , e , e L
+ − − δ +
+ − − μ +
− − λ +
− Π − + − Π = δ μ λ
 
The first order conditions are: 
()
) w ( u
q
0 ) w ( u ) w ( u q 0
w
. L
G
G G
G ′
= δ − μ ⇔ = ′ δ − ′ μ + − ⇔ =
∂
∂    (6) 
() ()
) w ( u
q 1
0 ) w ( u ) w ( u ) w ( u q 1 0
w
. L
B
B B B
B
′
−
= δ + μ − λ
⇔ = ′ δ + ′ μ − ′ λ + − − ⇔ =
∂
∂
   (7) 
() ()
()
) w ( u
e q
k
0 ) e ( v k ) e ( v e q 0
e
. L
B
G
G G G
G
′
Π′
= δ − μ
⇔ = ′ δ + ′ μ − Π′ ⇔ =
∂
∂
       (8) 
() () ()
() ()
) e ( v
e q 1
k k
0 ) e ( v k ) e ( v ) e ( v k e q 1 0
e
. L
B
B
G B B B
B
′
Π′ −
= δ + μ − λ
⇔ = ′ δ − ′ μ + ′ λ − Π′ − ⇔ =
∂
∂
   (9) 
Summing the relations (6) and (7), we get:  
() ()
0
w u
q 1
w u
q
B G >
′
−
+
′
= λ         (10) 
and adding the relations (8) and (9) we get:  
       ( )
()
( ) ( )
()
0
e v
e q 1
e v
e q
k B
B
G
G
>
′
Π′ −
+
′
Π′
= λ        (11) 
that shows the constraint (2) has to be satisfied:  U ) e ( kv ) w ( u
B B = − , and the less efficient agent 
will get exactly the reservation utility U.   
 
From the relation (6),  0 > μ .  
We assume that  0
) w ( u
q
0 G <
′
− = δ ⇒ = μ , which is impossible. From here, we obtain the 
relation (3) to be satisfied:  
) e ( v ) w ( u   ) e ( v ) w ( u
B B G G − = − , The Annals of “Dunarea de Jos” University of Galati  
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which means that the most efficient agent will get exactly the reservation utility. 
 
Before we present the characteristics of the optimal contract, we shall demonstrate that it can’t 
be optimal to offer a contract that requires the same effort from both types of agents. If 
B G e e = , 
then from the relation (5) we get:    0 ) w ( u ) w ( u
B G = − and, accordingly,  it results that 
B G w w = .  
 
From the relations (10) and (11), we can get:  
()
( )
() e v k
e
w u
1
′
Π′
=
′
= λ , 
 
for some values of e and w, common to both types of agents. Finally, the equations (6) and (8) 
lead to:  
()
δ + λ = δ +
′
= μ q
w u
q  
 
( )
() () δ + λ = δ + λ = δ +
′
Π′
= μ q k k qk k
e v
e q , 
 
which is impossible because  μ ≠ μ k  for  1 k > and 0 > μ . As a conclusion, the optimal menu of 
contracts will include two different contracts for the agent.  
 
Because 
B G e e > , it is not possible that both relations (3) and (4) will be saturated 
simultaneously.  1 k >  shows that one of the two inequalities from the expression (5) must be 
strict. The equation (3) can be rewritten:      
 
()) e ( v 1 k U
) e ( v ) 1 k ( ) e ( kv ) w ( u ) e ( v ) w ( u ) e ( v ) w ( u
B
B B B B B G G
− + =
− + − = − = −  
 
which means that the contract is destined to the most efficient agent and it allows him to get a 
profit strictly higher then his reservation utility. Because  0 = δ , the equations (6) and (8) show 
that:  
()
( )
()
G
G
G e v k
e
w u
1
′
Π′
=
′
, 
 
which is the condition that makes the contract ( )
G G w , e  to be chosen and is called the efficiency 
constraint. Finally, knowing that the relation (7) is equivalent to:   
 
()
λ −
′
−
= μ − B w u
q 1 , 
 
And the equation (9) can be rewritten using the equation (10):  
 
()
()
( )
()
( ) ( )
()
B
B
G B e v
e q 1
w u
1 k q
w u
k q 1
′
Π′ −
=
′
−
+
′
− , 
 
that leads to:  
()
()
( )
()
( )
() ()
B
B
B
G
B
e
w u
e v k
w u
e v
q 1
k 1 q
Π′ =
′
′
+
′
′
⋅
−
−  
 
which is the forth condition that defines the optimal contract.  q.e.d. The Annals of “Dunarea de Jos” University of Galati  
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Hence, the optimum menu of contracts  ( ) ( ) { }
B B G G w , e , w , e  is defined by the following equations:  
 
) e ( v ) 1 k ( U ) e ( v ) w ( u
B G G − + = −  
 
U ) e ( kv ) w ( u
B B = −  
 
) w ( u
) e ( v
) e ( *
*
*
G
G
G
′
′
= Π′  
 
( )
() ) w ( u
) e ( v
q 1
1 k q
) w ( u
) e ( v k
) e ( G
B
B
B
B
*
*
*
′
′
−
−
+
′
′
= Π′  
 
Conclusions  
 
The optimal menu of contracts  ( ) ( ) { }
B B G G w , e , w , e  has the following characteristics, as they are 
presented by Macho-Stadler and Castrillo: 
1.  the participation constraint is satisfied only for the agent with larger costs, while the 
other agent receives an information rent ( ) ( )
B e v 1 k− . This means that the most efficient 
agent receives a higher utility then the reservation utility due to the private information. 
This is a characteristic of the adverse selection contracts;  
2.  the incentive constraint for the most efficient agent is satisfied for the optimal solution 
while the incentive constraint for the other type of agent is not;  
3.  the efficiency constraint is satisfied for the type G agent. This property is known as the 
“no distortion at top” constraint and it shows that, for an adverse selection problem, the 
only efficient contract is the one for the agent nobody wants. If the agent is risk 
neutral, the efficiency constraint is not a function of 
G w  because  ( )
G w ' u  is a constant. 
So, 
B G e e = . If the agent is risk adverse, than the efficiency constraint is a function of 
G w . The optimal payment 
G w  in an adverse selection problem is different of 
* G w , 
which leads to  
* G G e e ≠ . But, the contract designed for the G type agent is efficient in 
both cases.  
4.  a distortion is included in the efficiency constraint for the B type agent. This is 
explained by the fact that a contract ( )
B B w , e  is designed to be less attractive to G type 
agent. By this distortion, the principal loses some part of his efficiency due to the B 
type agent but he pays informational rents smaller than the ones to G type agent. This 
trade between these two effects is favorable to the distortion process.       
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